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CHALLENGES SHARED BY RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND STRICT L IABIL ITY
IN THE ABSENCE OF MENS REA
Golan Luzon*
Restorative justice programs have rapidly gained in popularity as a means of
peaceful conﬂict resolution. At the same time, the programs raise concerns because
in order to join, offenders assume responsibility for their acts, are automatically
held culpable, and forfeit their rights under criminal law for representation,
judicial review, and uniform sentencing, among others. Restorative justice shares
this automatic culpability with strict liability, an older and proven legal tool that
has had long experience convicting defendants without the need to prove mens
rea. The present article explores the similarities between restorative justice pro-
grams and strict liability, with a view toward learning from the experience
accumulated by strict liability in dealing with the absence of mens rea. To this
end, the article discusses the distinction made under strict liability between
incriminating and escalating responsibility, and explores the beneﬁts that
restorative justice programs can derive from such a distinction.
Keywords: strict liability, restorative justice, culpability, responsibility,
mens rea
I N TRODUCT ION
In many countries, dissatisfaction and frustration with the formal justice
system, as well as an interest in preserving and strengthening traditional
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legal practices, have led to a search for alternative responses to crime and
social disorder.1 This is how restorative justice programs have emerged,
based on the belief that the parties to the offense should be actively
involved in healing the rift created by the criminal incident. The programs
have also been perceived as a means of encouraging peaceful conﬂict res-
olution, advocating tolerance, building mutual respect, and promoting
community practices based on assuming responsibility.2
Assuming responsibility appears to be such a necessary and positive act
that the problems it raises are often hidden from sight. One concern, which
is the focus of the present article, is that the drive to refer many cases to
restorative justice processes encourages defendants to assume responsibility
for their acts without their culpability having been proven. Because of their
desire to escape the consequences of their acts under criminal law, defen-
dants assume responsibility for their actions, forfeiting the beneﬁts of the
protections granted to them under criminal law. As a result, restorative
justice threatens to become a kind of strict liability mechanism, where
defendants are convicted without their culpability having been proven.
Comparing restorative justice with strict liability is not straightforward.
‘‘Restorative justice’’ is a general label for alternative methods of dispute
resolution in criminal law.3 Strict liability is a type of liability for which
mens rea does not have to be proven in relation to one or more elements
comprising the actus reus. Note that strict liability is not a degree of cul-
pability; the defendant is automatically held culpable. Similarly, in the case
of restorative justice, because participation in the process requires taking
responsibility, there is no need formens rea to be proven, and the defendant
is automatically held culpable. Because of the similarity between the doc-
trine of strict criminal liability and the principles underlying restorative
justice programs, and because in some criminal justice systems strict lia-
bility has been in existence for over a century, this article compares the two
in an attempt to learn from the challenges they share.
Following this introduction, the article reviews the role of culpability in
criminal law and its effect on perpetrators assuming responsibility for their
1. HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
(2002).
2. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE HANDBOOK SERIES (2006).
3. Alana Saulnier & Diane Sivasubramaniam, Restorative Justice: Underlying Mechanisms
and Future Directions, 18 NCLR 510–36 (2015).
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actions, with special emphasis on the importance of assuming responsibility
in restorative justice programs, and on the concerns this raises. Next, it
conceptualizes strict liability and compares it with restorative justice.
Finally, a key distinction is made between incriminating and escalating
strict liability, which may be proﬁtably implemented in restorative justice.
The article concludes with the practical suggestion that referrals to restor-
ative justice programs should be made in four stages, with a correlation
between the severity of the offense (and of punishment) and the stage at
which the defendant is referred to the program.
I. CULPABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW
In many legal systems, the presumption of innocence is a constitutional
right of defendants in a criminal trial.4 If a person is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, the burden of proof is on the prosecution, which must
collect and present satisfactory and convincing evidence that the accused is
culpable beyond a reasonable doubt. In most legal systems, to convict
a defendant of a crime in accordance with due process, the prosecution
must satisfy the requirements of the factual element of the crime (actus reus)
and of a corresponding mental element (mens rea). For example, the Model
Penal Code (MPC)5 refers to mens rea as culpability. According to the
MPC, every substantive element of every crime has a corresponding state
of culpability (purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence)6 that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.7
Criminal law ascribes overwhelming weight to the perpetrator’s mental
state or consciousness because it is an indication of the individual’s will
being carried out. It is the condition for imposing criminal liability on the
perpetrator and for establishing his culpability.8 If the mental element is
missing, it is not possible to impose criminal liability, and without criminal
4. For example, it is regarded as an international human right under the U.N. Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 11.
5. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (Ofﬁcial Draft and Revised Comments,
1985) [hereinafter MPC]. The MPC has served and continues to serve as a basis for the
replacement of existing criminal codes in over two-thirds of the states.
6. MPC § 2.02, General Requirements of Culpability.
7. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES (3d ed.
2012); PAUL H. ROBINSON, TEACHER’S MANUAL FOR CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND
CONTROVERSIES (2d ed. 2008).
8. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2003).
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liability, it is not possible to convict the perpetrator. At the same time, the
criminal process may deter perpetrators from assuming responsibility for
their actions because defendants fear that it will lead to the imposition of
criminal liability, conviction, and punishment. Defendants use various
legal strategies to evade responsibility, often on the advice of their attor-
neys. These actions serve to intensify their lack of empathy toward the
victim and the community, and create a sense of mutual alienation between
them and society. This feeling is exacerbated throughout the legal process,
and even more so during incarceration.
II. RESPONSIBILITY IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
In restorative justice, responsibility plays an important role, and accept-
ing it (a sine qua non requirement for joining the process)9 involves
confronting the consequences of the offense, including the effects of the
conduct and the damages caused, and taking positive steps to repair the
rift created by the offense. Assuming such responsibility is good for the
victims, society, and the offenders because it combines responsibility for past
actions with responsibility for present and future ones. The objective of this
responsibility is to provide for the needs of the victim and of society, but also
of the offender, in order to change him into a responsible agent, integrated
within society.
Initially, responsibility deals with the damages caused, encourages
mutual empathy, and relieves the sense of shame. In the second stage, it
encourages personal change in the present, correcting the injurious con-
duct, coping with addictions, and improving personal skills. In the third
stage, responsibility fosters future support for integrating the offender into
the community. In restorative justice the process is far from complete with
the conclusion of the restorative agreement among the parties (offender,
victim, community), and it follows up on the offender meeting his obliga-
tions under the agreement as genuine proof of accepting responsibility.10
9. Acknowledging the basic facts of the crime and accepting responsibility is an
important condition, stressed by international regulations on restorative justice. It can also
be found in national laws, for example: New Zealand, Children, Young Persons, and Their
Families Act § 259 (1989); Canada, Youth Criminal Justice Act § (e)(2)(20) (2003); Australia,
Juvenile Justice Act § 22 (1993); Belgium, Act of 22 June 2005 on Victim-Offender
Mediation.
10. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989).
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Taking into account the responsibility of the offender for past actions,
restorative justice emphasizes the circumstances that have led to his situa-
tion and recognizes retrospective responsibility, requiring us to explore the
damages that the offenders themselves have sustained. In this aspect, restor-
ative justice differs from criminal law, which gives priority to an internalist
approach that examines responsibility only at the moment of action.11
Restorative justice processes adopt an externalist approach and ascribe
substantial weight to the history that preceded the act. Research shows
that a signiﬁcant portion of offenders sustained severe trauma in their lives
and regard themselves as victims. Past damages and the self-perception of
victimhood on the part of offenders can contribute greatly to crime.12
Research shows that unresolved trauma tends to be reenacted if it is not
properly treated, and it is liable to affect offenders, victims, and their
families in future generations.13 Criminal law tends to respond to trauma
with new trauma, such as incarceration. Under restorative justice, the
trauma does not serve as an excuse for not accepting responsibility for past
actions, but helps the parties understand the offender and helps the
offender assume responsibility henceforth. Concern with history helps the
offender accept future-oriented responsibility for his rehabilitation and for
restoring the rift caused by his act.
III. CONCERN WITH ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY IN
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
It is a common argument that restorative justice processes, such as victim-
offender mediation, may help defendants escape the clutches of formal
11. JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: AN
ESSAY ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998). The internalist theory examines the psycho-
logical structure only at the precise moment of action, dividing time and addressing only the
last slice. The externalist theory recognizes that freedom and responsibility depend on
a psychological structure created by a causal history preceding that moment in time. The
history includes causal characteristics found outside the agent, such as the education and
socialization that shaped his or her values and beliefs.
12. JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC (1996)
(arguing that all violence is an effort to achieve justice or to repair historic injustice, and
that many criminal acts are a result of the offender’s efforts to overcome the sense of
victimhood).
13. See SANDRA BLOOM, CREATING SANCTUARY: TOWARD THE EVOLUTION OF SANE
SOCIETIES (1997).
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criminal proceedings and strike an advantageous compromise.14 The con-
cern is that by assuming responsibility for his actions, the accused waives the
court hearing, joins one of restorative justice procedures, and avoids convic-
tion and sentencing in court.15
But there is another side to the coin. Restorative justice processes are not
compromises or mediation in the civil sense of the word, and may end in
sentencing and punishment. Restorative interventions can be initiated at
any stage of the criminal proceedings. In some countries restorative inter-
vention is possible in parallel with prosecution and can be considered as
part of the punishment.16 The concern is that in their eagerness to begin
the process of restorative justice, defendants will rush to assume responsi-
bility for their acts, forfeiting their legal rights,17 which are the basis for the
requirement that the prosecution prove the culpability of the accused and
therefore his criminal liability. Fearing prosecution, defendants might
choose mediation even before they are aware of the evidence against them,
the scope of defenses at their disposal, and before having analyzed the
situation adequately.18 Even if restorative justice promotes fair results,
fairness is not only a function of the outcome of the case; it also has to
do with the proceedings that have led to this result. Defendants need the
protection of criminal proceedings, including the right to legal representa-
tion and a judicial review that ensures that they do not assume responsi-
bility under pressure. They also need the protection of evidentiary laws and
of uniform sentencing.19
There is concern that in some cases the restorative justice process
achieves the objective of punishment (a ﬁne or community service) by
blaming and punishing a person without his liability having been proven
14. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural
Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994).
15. ROBERT B. COATES & JOHN GEHM, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: AN EVALUATION
OF VICTIM-OFFENDER RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS 4 (1985) (surveyed offenders said that
their primary goal in participating in VOM was to ‘‘avoid harsher punishment’’).
16. IVO AERTSEN, R. MACKAY, C. PELIKAN, J. WILLEMSENS, & M. WRIGHT,
REBUILDING COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS: MEDIATION AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN
EUROPE 24 (2004).
17. Mark S. Umbreit, Mediation of Victim Offender Conﬂict, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 85, 88
(1988).
18. Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restor-
ative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 758–71 (2000).
19. Brown, supra note 14, at 1247.
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according to the rules of criminal law. Consider the case of a person accused
of assaulting his neighbor in the course of an argument, and suppose that
the event was captured by security cameras. Before the person can be
convicted in court, however, the prosecution must still prove that mens
rea compatible with the assault was present. But to avoid the criminal
proceeding, the defendant may assume responsibility for the assault in
order to join a process of restorative justice, and pay monetary or equivalent
compensation without his criminal liability having been proven.
Note that assuming responsibility in restorative justice is more than
a manifestation of the usual process that takes place in criminal law. Unlike
plea bargaining, for example, which promotes a settlement inside the court
and under the watchful eye of the criminal code, restorative justice pro-
grams may be considered as diversion schemes that often include sanctions
outside the court.20
Under the circumstances described above there is a similarity between
the restorative justice process and the strict liability model in criminal law:
in both cases it is possible to impose criminal liability on a person without
proving his culpability. Strict liability has existed for many years, and it has
become an integral part of criminal law despite the criticism that has been
leveled against it. It is possible to examine the legal development of restor-
ative justice by comparing it with strict liability, and discuss the imple-
mentation of restorative justice processes for many offenses by reference to
strict liability offenses.
IV. STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Strict liability is imposed on defendants in criminal cases without having to
prove their culpability.21 To convict a defendant, most criminal codes
require proof of a mental element compatible with the offense: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. In the case of strict liability
offenses, however, the defendant can be convicted and held liable for the
offense without the need to prove any of the mental elements.22
20. Andrew Ashworth, Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice, 42 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 578, 581–82 (2002).
21. In some legal systems, strict liability is the absence of proof of mens rea; in others,
strict liability is the absence of mens rea.
22. Stephen J. Morse, Commentary: Reﬂections on Remorse, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 49 (2014).
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Over the years, strict liability was accepted constitutionally as a legiti-
mate basis for the imposition of criminal liability for a variety of offenses.23
In the United States, the Supreme Court has ruled consistently that strict
liability is not contrary to the U.S. Constitution because it is consistent
with the principles of criminal law.24 Similar recognition was granted
by state law in the United States,25 England,26 and in most legal systems
worldwide.27
Despite its exceptional nature, the doctrine of strict liability was
accepted in criminal law for several reasons.28 First, its procedural efﬁciency
is complemented by economic efﬁciency. Legislatures have assumed that if
the prosecution is required to prove mens rea or negligence, it is difﬁcult to
impose criminal liability for offenses where the evidence concerning the
existence of mens rea is entirely in the possession of the defendant.
Strict liability has educational beneﬁts as well, because it uses the law to
convey a message to the public and because of the deterrence it creates.29
Therefore, strict liability helps create a high standard of public behavior
and caution. The expectation is that in certain areas the public will show
23. G. R. Sullivan, Strict Liability for Criminal Offences in England and Wales Following
Incorporation into English Law of the European Convention on Human Right, Appraising strict
liability, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY, Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and
Justice (Andrew Simester ed., 2005).
24. For example: Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959);
Lambert v. California, 355U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957); Texaco Inc. v. Short,
454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 120
S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000).
25. For example: State v. Stepniewski, 105 Wis.2d 261, 314 N.W.2d 261, 314 N.W.2d 98
(1982); State v. Mcdowell, 312 N.W.2d 301 (N.D. 1981); State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105
(Alaska 1975); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978); Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821
(Alaska 1980); State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La. 1980).
26. For example: G., (2008) U.K.H.L. 37, (2009) A.C. 92; Barnfather v. Islington
London Borough Council, (2003) E.W.H.C. 418 (Admin), (2003) 1W.L.R 2318 (2003), E.L.
R. 263.
27. For example: Australia: Kennedy, (1981) V.R. 565; White, (1979) 23 A.L.R. 439;
Harris, (1999) T.A.S.S.C. 53 D.C.R. 416; New Zealand: Department of Health v. Multi-
chem Laboratories Ltd., (1987) 1 N.Z.L.R. 334; Canada: Kanda, (2008) O.J. No. 80, 2008
O.N.C.A. 22, 22.
28. NICOLA LACEY, CELIA WELLS, & OLIVER QUICK, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL
LAW (2006).
29. About models of social control that focus on the ability of the law to shape people’s
behavior, see FRANKLIN ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, & JAMES VORENBERG, DETER-
RENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
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increased responsibility and behave more cautiously, which will prevent
harm to people and property.30
V. THE SHARED CHALLENGES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND
STRICT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Over the years, the doctrine of strict liability elicited many criticisms, the
most important being that it violates a fundamental principle of criminal
law whereby no liability should be imposed without proof of culpability
(nullum crimen sine culpa). According to the same principle, there can be no
crime without criminal intent. Strict liability offenses, in which criminal
liability is imposed without proof of culpability, contradict the nature of
criminal law. The principle of criminal law is violated both when we
impose liability on the defendant without proof of culpability and when
the defendant assumes responsibility in order to participate in a restorative
justice process, which in practice allows taking punitive action against him
without proving his culpability.
The justiﬁcation of the doctrine of strict liability was based primarily on
utilitarian reasons, aimed at promoting efﬁcient regulation of various rou-
tine and essential areas of activity having to do with public policy. In the
case of strict liability, the efﬁciency is ﬁrst and foremost economic, by
diverting procedural costs from society to the defendant.31 Similarly, it is
possible to justify the process of restorative justice, wherein the defendant
assumes responsibility for his action, for utilitarian reasons. Many studies
have found that restorative justice processes were more effective than tra-
ditional criminal proceedings in preventing recidivism and future harm. It
is further assumed that the restorative justice model serves the victim’s
needs more efﬁciently than does the traditional criminal process by redres-
sing the wrongs and damages caused by the crime.32
30. Mordechai Kremnizer, Justiﬁed Deviations from the Requirement of ‘‘Mens Rea,’’ 13(1)
BAR-ILAN LAW STUDIES 109 (1996).
31. Admittedly, the legal presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts often has the effect of shifting the burden of proof when it comes to
purpose or knowledge. But in many cases this is impossible (see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510 (1979)), and the prosecution has no choice but to prove mens rea beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, even if it is difﬁcult to do so. In this sense, strict liability helps the prose-
cution by shifting the burden of proof entirely to the defendant.
32. Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What is it and does it work?, 3 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 161 (2007). Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Process,
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Nevertheless, because the doctrine of strict liability and restorative jus-
tice processes affect both conviction and punishment in criminal law, they
cannot rely exclusively on utilitarian reasons.33 Indeed, classical criticism
against strict liability in criminal law comes from retributionists.34 The
theory of retribution is part of deontological moral teaching, according
to which the imposition of liability on the defendant not only serves a util-
itarian end, but it is a moral duty to retaliate in a manner appropriate to the
severity of the crime.35 The degree of culpability and punishment must suit
the gravity of the offense in order to balance the moral equation. Despite its
utility, strict criminal liability might lead to punishing the innocent; it is
therefore not fair according to a retrospective theory of retribution.36
VI. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INCRIMINATING AND ESCALATING
STRICT LIABILITY
To justify the strict liability doctrine within criminal law, it is necessary to
impose substantial restrictions on its use. Therefore, strict liability offenses
were presented as light ones that require relatively mild punishment. Thus,
even if the principle whereby no criminal responsibility can be imposed
without culpability is violated, the harm is not severe if the offenses are
minor and the punishment not harsh. In practice, however, strict liability
offenses are more complex and not restricted exclusively to light criminal
offenses. In principle, if the defendant committed a strict liability offense, it
is possible to impose liability on him and convict him without the prose-
cution having to prove his culpability.
But it is necessary to distinguish between incriminating and escalating
strict liability. For incriminating strict liability, culpability is not required
Outcomes Stakeholders, inHANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 209 (G. Johnstone &D.W.
Van Ness eds., 2007). MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994). Mark S. Umbreit & Robert B. Coates,
Victim Offender Mediation: An Evolving Evidence Based Practice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTOR-
ATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 52 (D. Sullivan & L. Tifft eds., 2006).
33. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPAR-
ATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 198–99 (2007).
34. MICHAEL KING, ARIE FREIBERG, BECKY BATAGOL, & ROSS HYAMS, NON-AD-
VERSARIAL JUSTICE 44–45 (2009).
35. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64PHIL. REV. 3, 5 (1955).
36. Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2313 (2013).
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with regard to each essential element of the offense. For escalating strict
liability, culpability is required with regard to at least one essential element
but not for an additional element that creates a more severe offense.37 In
the case of incriminating strict liability, we convict the defendant because
of strict liability imposed on him without having proven his culpability. In
the case of escalating strict liability, we convict the defendant of a more
severe offense than the offense for which he was proven culpable. For
example, unlawfully taking property in excess of a speciﬁed amount is
grand larceny, whereas unlawfully taking property of less than that amount
is petty larceny. Therefore, if the defendant is found culpable of petty
larceny, but the amount stolen turns out to place the crime in the category
of grand larceny, there is no need for the prosecution to prove mens rea for
the more serious offense.38
Analysis of the instances of strict liability reveals that the range of
offenses for which the law allows the imposition of strict liability is broader
than it appears at ﬁrst. The argument that criminal liability is imposed
without the need to prove mens rea only for minor offenses that involve
light punishment is inaccurate,39 and a broad survey shows that legislatures
allow imposing strict liability to convict defendants also of serious crimes
and to impose harsh penalties.40
How are serious offenses of strict liability reconciled with the require-
ments of retribution?41 In the case of incriminating strict liability offenses,
a problem can arise because a person is convicted and punished without
criminal intent having been proven in his actions. But the relatively light
punishment for these offenses offsets and softens the harm to retribution.
37. Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless Attempts,
53 OHIO ST L.J. 1057, 1066 n.24 (1992). See MPC § 223.1.
38. Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1075 (1997). This argument is based on Simons’s discrimination between the
two types of strict liability, but the terms used in his article have been changed here to
‘‘incriminating’’ and ‘‘escalating’’ because they more accurately reﬂect the nature of these
two types of liability.
39. Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts: Strict Liability,
and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7(2) SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84 (1990).
40. Jeremy Horder, Strict Liability, Statutory Construction and the Spirit of Liberty, 118
LAW Q. REV. 458 (2002).
41. Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1988).
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In the case of escalating strict liability offenses, proving culpability is
required for at least one substantive element. Therefore, the culpability
that must be proven in court can justify, from the point of view of retri-
bution, the conviction and punishment of the defendant.42
VII. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INCRIMINATING AND
ESCALATING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMS
Are restorative justice programs offered in the case of offenses involving
a high degree of culpability? History shows that most restorative justice
programs are designed for minor offenses or juvenile offenders caught in
their ﬁrst criminal act, and they offer a range of effective alternatives for
youths at risk. Because of their educational value, these programs are
especially useful for diverting the cases away from the court and for pro-
viding alternatives to punishment, and especially incarceration, of the
youths. But programs have often been developed for adult offenders as
well, and in recent years an increasing number of countries allow more
severe offenders to participate in restorative justice processes. For example,
in 2004, the Australian legislation made explicit provisions for implemen-
tation of restorative justice programs, for young and adult offenders alike,
for crimes of domestic violence.43 Similarly, restorative justice programs
have been developed in many countries for adult offenders and serious
offenses.44
How is restorative justice reconciled with the demand for retribution45 in
the case of serious offenses? Similarly to the doctrine of strict liability, it is
possible to distinguish between incriminating strict liability and escalating
strict liability within the restorative justice process as well. Concern with
encouraging defendants to assume responsibility without criminal intent
42. About the moral justiﬁcation of retribution, see details in LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISH-
MENT AND RETRIBUTION (2006).
43. Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT) §§ 16(1), (2).
44.MARK S. UMBREIT &MARILYN P. ARMOUR, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DIALOGUE: AN
ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (2011). For restorative justice schemes in
the United Kingdom, see JOANNA SHAPLAND, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN PRACTICE:
EVALUATING WHAT WORKS FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS (2011). For restorative justice
schemes in Canada, see James S. Latimer, The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A
Meta-Analysis, 85(2) PRISON J. 127 (2005).
45. Michael Wenzel, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather, & Michael J. Platow,
Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375 (2008).
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having been proven is not equal in all cases. Cases are referred to the
restorative justice programs at different stages of the criminal proceeding.
For minor offenses, the referral is usually made by the police, even before
indictment, and the defendant assumes responsibility at an early stage of the
proceeding, forfeiting the defenses available to him. Assuming responsibility
is what allows him to participate in the process, but it is also what incrimi-
nates him. The balance is restored by the fact that the offenses are light and
that offenders are referred to the restorative justice processes at an early stage,
so that the restorative agreement does not impose severe sanctions on the
defendant. At the next level, the referral to the restorative process is made by
the prosecution, after ﬁling the indictment but before the trial. The offenses
in question are still relatively minor, and even if the defendant assumes
responsibility in order to avoid going to trial, the sanctions that are part of
the restorative agreement are relatively light.
In later stages, it is the court that refers cases to restorative justice, before
sentencing or as part of the punishment and as an alternative to incarcer-
ation (or to a portion of it). In these cases the offenses are serious and
punishment is commensurate. But assuming responsibility as part of the
process of restorative justice at these stages is not incriminating, because the
culpability of the defendant has already been proven and linked to some
degree of criminal intent at the conviction stage. Therefore, a successful
restorative justice process can only mitigate the punishment or serve as
a substitute for it. In some sense, assuming responsibility after the criminal
intent has been proven only escalates the severity of the sentence or the
length of incarceration.
The point at which the case is referred to the restorative justice programs
de facto determines the extent to which the defendant’s assumption of
responsibility incriminates the offender or escalates the offense. The restor-
ative justice program in effect in Nova Scotia, Canada (Nova Scotia Restor-
ative Justice) serves as a good example.46 From the inception of this
program, its declared objective was to become a comprehensive alternative
to the criminal justice system and to realize the principles of restorative
justice for young and adult offenders alike, for their victims, their families,
and their communities. The program was the focus of a comprehensive
46. Bruce Archibald & Jennifer Llewellyn, The Challenges of Institutionalizing Com-
prehensive Restorative Justice: Theory and Practice in Nova Scotia, 29 DALHOUSIE L.J. 297
(2006).
RESTORAT IVE JUST ICE AND STR ICT L IAB IL I TY | 589
study that examines the development of restorative justice practice in
Canada. Discretion in referring cases to NSRJ depends on the level (sever-
ity) of the offense. Level 4 offenses are the most severe ones. These offenses
can be referred to the program only at the stages of punishment (sentenc-
ing) and imprisonment (by detention ofﬁcers). This applies, for example,
to offenders convicted of rape or murder. Level 3 offenders can be referred
to the program after indictment and before trial, or after the trial, at the
sentencing stage. The offenses are serious ones, such as fraud and theft of
large amounts (over $20,000), robbery, sex offenses, aggravated assault,
criminal negligence, reckless driving resulting in death, manslaughter, and
domestic violence. In other words, restorative justice does not divert of-
fenses at levels of severity 3 and 4 from the formal legal process, but is
supplemental to the sentencing process; therefore, it does not incriminate
the accused but escalates the degree of punishment.
Restorative justice programs used to divert cases from the formal legal
process or to serve as alternatives to formal court proceedings begin at level
2 offenses. These offenses constitute the largest category, and can be
referred to the restorative justice process at each of the four entry points.
This means that the police and the district attorney can refer the bulk of
criminal offenses to the restorative justice program instead of prosecuting
them, but punishment, as in cases of strict criminal liability, is relatively
light. Offenses of severity level 1 are misdemeanors, such as purchasing
alcohol illegally, minor property offenses, disorderly conduct, and assault
without damage or bodily harm; in these cases, the referral does incriminate
the accused, but the punishment is mild.
The Nova Scotia model, based on the severity of offenses, shows how
a rating can be implemented in restorative justice practice. According to this
model, the lighter the offense, the earlier it is referred to the restorative justice
program; in these cases the referral incriminates the accused, but punishment
is light. The more severe the offense, the later it is referred to the restorative
justice program; referral, however, does not incriminate the accused but
rather increases his punishment, although on occasion it may lighten it.
CONCLUS ION AND PRACT ICAL RECOMMENDAT ION
Classic offenses of strict criminal liability are considered relatively light
(such as public welfare offenses), where the conduct of the defendant raises
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a presumption of culpability. The defendant is responsible for his act and is
punished for it without proof ofmens rea. In due course, these offenses have
been adapted to the principles of criminal law through clear legislation that
allowed increasing the severity of the offense for certain crimes and impos-
ing responsibility on defendants without proving their culpability in a crim-
inal trial.
Analysis of the instances of strict liability in criminal law shows that the
range of offenses for which the law allows the imposition of strict liability
is broader than it seems. We distinguish between relatively light, ‘‘crimi-
nalizing’’ offenses and ‘‘escalating’’ ones, which can be more serious. In
offenses in which assuming responsibility incriminates, the balance is
restored by the lesser degree of culpability and lighter punishment. In the
case of more serious offenses, where the assumption of responsibility is
escalating, the level of culpability is high and punishment often severe. In
the case of such an offense, the balance lies in the fact that the source of
culpability in mens rea is already present in one of the other elements of the
offense. Thus, a regime of strict liability is consistent with the retributive
approach because the correlation between the degree of culpability and the
severity of punishment is retained at all levels.
Similarly, we should distinguish between assuming incriminating and
escalating responsibility in restorative justice programs. Referral to restor-
ative justice programs is made in four stages, with a correlation between the
severity of the offense (and of punishment) and the stage at which the
defendant is referred to the program. In early-stage referrals, before indict-
ment, the offense is relatively light, and even if assuming responsibility
incriminates the defendant, the punishment is quite light. If the defendant
is referred to the restorative program later in the process, assuming respon-
sibility has a less incriminating and a more escalating effect on punishment.
Thus, even if the punishment is severe, it may be mitigated following
a restorative process. Similarly to strict criminal liability, the balance
between the severity of punishment, the degree of culpability, and the
function of responsibility allows the processes of restorative justice to be
fair and reasonable, and at the same time consistent with retributive theory.
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